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I. STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this ippeal 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW. 
A. Did the trial court err in concluding that Congress did 
not preempt the State of Utah ("State") from requiring 
the payment of Utah property taxes on boats as a 
condition for the defendants enjoying the waters of 
Lake Powell within the exterior boundaries of the 
GCNRA? 
B. Did the trial court err in concluding that the payment 
of property taxes on boats whose payment would be 
significantly more than what the Coast Guard would 
charge and much more than the cost of using Y -its in 
surrounding states as a precondition for the 
defendants' use of Lake Powell and the waters within 
the GCNRA, does not impermissibly interfere with 
interstate commerce? 
C. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases 
are reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 
1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 
1991). Utah cases teach that "correctness" means that the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
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in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
D. RECORD SUPPORTING THE PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE. 
E. GROUND FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF AN ISSUE NOT PRESERVED AT 
TRIAL COURT. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE DETERMINATION IS DETERMINATIVE. 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18 
United States Constitution, Article VI 
Utah Boating Act, U.C.A. § 73-18-7 
Utah Property Tax Act, U.C.A. § 59-2-301 
Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. and 13101 
et seq. 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act, 86 Stat. 1311 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from the decision of the district court 
denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the citations against 
them issued by an agent of the State of Utah, Department of 
Natural Resources, Division of Parks and Recreation ("State" or 
"the Division"). The citations charged that the defendants 
violated U.C.A. § 73-18-7(1), by failing to register their boats 
with an agency of the State. The trial judge held that the 
defendants failed to persuade the court that Congress intended to 
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divest the State generally of its power to enforce state laws 
within the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area ("GCNRA"). 
Further, the court held that the State did not violate the 
Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by 
imposing its property tax upon the defendants as a condition of 
the defendants using their boats within the GCNRA. This appeal 
seeks to reverse the decision of the district court and seeks a 
declaration that the State does not have jurisdiction over 
persons and their property within the exterior boundaries of the 
GCNRA, to the extent that such persons and their property are 
engaged in recreation activities and other activities for which 
the GCNRA has been created and used. The defendants each entered 
a conditional plea of no contest to the charges, for the purpose 
of preserving all issues pertaining to jurisdiction and with the 
understanding that defendants preserve the right to withdraw 
their plea if they are successful on appeal. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
Congress has enacted a series of laws that extensively 
govern activities occurring within the Colorado River corridor 
and within the GCNRA, and the federal executive departments have 
promulgated extensive, detailed and broadly applied regulations, 
that cumulatively have displaced and preempted the operation of 
state laws within the GCNRA, including the boat registration 
laws. 
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The Division and the county assessors of those counties that 
include portions of Lake Powell are enforcing the Utah Boating 
Act and the Utah Property Tax Act in a manner that requires the 
defendants to pay the Utah property tax on their boats before 
either of the defendants will be issued a boat registration 
number. The cost of registering the defendants' boats in Utah 
far exceed the cost of registration of the same boats in the 
states of their residence or with the Coast Guard. The State's 
boat registration law, as implemented, in effect interferes with 
the rights of the defendants arising under the United States 
Constitution at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 in that the tax 
has no substantial nexus to the activities of the State within 
the GCNRA, and is not fairly related to services provided by the 
State. 
VI. ARGUMENT. 
A. BACKGROUND FACTS. 
The GCNRA is a component of a series of water projects 
within the Colorado River system. The Colorado River is an 
intensely federally regulated river whose water is heavily 
depended upon by seven western states and Mexico. Congress has 
enacted numerous laws directed at the River, including the 
Colorado River Compact of 1922, U.C.A. § 73-12a-2, the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057, the Mexican Water Treaty, 
Treaty Series 994, 59 Stat. 1219, the Act of August 30, 1935 
(Parker Dam), the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act of 1940, 
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54 Stat. 774, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1949, 
63 Stat. 31, the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, 
52 Stc . 31, the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 
82 Stat. 885, and the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act of 
1972, 86 Stat. 1311. To meet the River's obligations to these 
states and Mexico, Congress enacted as series of laws that (1) 
allocate water among the upper and lower basin states, (2) 
authorize various water projects, (3) assure a minimum flow into 
Mexico, and (4) authorize water storage and water use for 
navigation, electrical power, irrigation, recreation, and other 
interstate uses. 
The water stored behind the Glen Canyon Dam at the 
southern end of the upper basin within Lake Powell is stored for 
the use of the lower basin states and Mexico as those waters are 
needed by them. 72 U.S. Code C^ng. and Adm. News, p. 4919. In 
1972, Congress created the GCNRA to take recreational and scenic 
advantage of the 200 miles of lake reservoir that follows the 
Colorado River upstream. As a result of the mandate of the Utah 
Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 995, and the 
GCNRA Act, the GCNRA is or soon will be totally comprised of 
federal land. Also, see 72 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, 
p. 4921. The GCNRA is totally isolated from non-federal lands by 
adjacent blocks of national monuments, national parks, public 
domain and Indian lands. Id. at 4915. 
PICKBTT\PLBADING\Brief.UCA -5-
On these federally owned lands and waters within the 
GCNRA, congressionally authorized activities are managed by 
federal agencies: (1) operation of the Glen Canyon Dam by the 
Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") in accordance with an integrated 
plan for the entire river; (2) operation of the land and water 
areas as a national park and recreation area by the National Park 
Service ("NPS"); and (3) operation of federal lands in accordance 
with the Federal Land Management Policy Act and other federal 
land statutes. 1972 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 4919. 
Congress designed the GCNRA as a multiple-use area where 
recreation is given top billing with electrical power generation, 
irrigation, water storage, and other important national goals. 
Id. The BOR and NPS have divided the Department of the 
Interior's activities primarily between them with the BOR being 
responsible for the dam's operation and maintenance and the NPS 
being responsible for the remainder of the GCNRA's operations. 
Id. 
According to Section 8 of the GCNRA Act, access to the 
recreational services within the GCNRA consists of the United 
States Department of Transportation ("DOT") providing road access 
to the principal land areas within the GCNRA land areas and Lake 
Powell and NPS providing road access in the other areas within 
the GCNRA. How the land is used is extensively regulated by 
Interior agencies. How the water surface is used is extensively 
regulated by both NPS and DOT'S Coast Guard. 
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The GCNRA is a self-contained community where principal 
services are either directly provided by federal agencies or 
indirectly provided by NPS's concessioner. Such services include 
those that are within the traditional police powers of a state. 
See United States v. Smith, 713 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Nominal services are provided by the state and local governments 
whom are either directly reimbursed or whom are indirectly 
reimbursed through congressional appropriations as payments in 
lieu of taxes. The trial court characterized the federal 
regulation of activities within the GCNRA as "extensive, even 
pervasive." [Record at p. 166]. 
The Bullfrog Marina operated by the concessioner offers 
overnight lodging, restaurants, campgrounds, and even an 
airstrip, in addition to the marina and other lake-related 
facilities and services. ae concessioner also operates three 
other marinas with varying degrees of service in accordance with 
contracts with the NPS. In 1973, approximately 1.2 million 
people visited the GCNRA. By 1983, these numbers had increased 
to two million, with most visitors entering by way of Arizona 
highways. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F.Supp. 594, 597, n.4 
(D. Utah 1987). In 1991, visitor usage increased to 
approximately three million. The GCNRA arguably is "the most 
heavily visited of all the areas in the interior West managed by 
the NPS, receiving more visitors each year than the Grand Canyon, 
more even than Yellowstone." Glen Canyon and the Struggle For 
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the Soul of the West, Russell Martin, Henry Holt and Company, 
Inc., 1989, p. 6. 
The defendants are non-Utah residents whose only 
contacts within the State occur within the self-contained GCNRA 
community, principally at Lake Powell where they have maintained 
their recreational boats since the early 1980s (R. 2) . Each 
defendant has obtained boat registration permits from other 
states that include identification information that has been 
publicly displayed on their boats (R. 2) . The cost of boat 
registration in the defendants' states of residence are 
substantially less than the State of Utah's requirements and is 
also substantially less than the cost of registering with the 
United States Coast Guard. 
In 1994, the defendants were cited by an agent of the 
State of Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of Parks 
and Recreation, for violating U.C.A. §73-18-7(1) which provides 
that: 
"(1)(a) Each motorboat . . . on the waters of 
the state shall be registered, unless it is 
exempt . . . . 
(b) A person may not place or give permission 
for the placement of a motorboat . . . on 
any waters of this state . . . unless the 
motorboat . . . is registered in accordance 
with this chapter or is exempt from 
registration as provided for in Section 
73-18-9. 
(c) The division before issuing a 
registration card and registration decals 
shall require . . . a certificate from the 
county assessor of the county in which the 
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motorboat . . . has situs for taxation 
containing one of the following statements: 
(i) the property tax on the motorboat . . . 
for the current year has been paid . . . . 
(6) The non-resident owner of any motorboat . 
. . already covered by a valid number . . . 
shall be exempt from registration . . . 
unless he is operating in excess of the 
reciprocity period provided for in Subsection 
73-18-9(1) ." 
Utah law at U.C.A. §73-18-9(1) (1994) provided that a 
non-resident owner with a valid out-of-state registration would 
not be required to register in this state if he had not been 
within the state in excess of 14 days for the calendar year. 
In May, 1994, defendant Sterkel received a letter 
from a Division Ranger addressed to Lake Powell boat owners, that 
warned him that Coast Guard documentation was not adequate to 
comply with State boat registration laws. (R. 6). 
The moorage slips, boat storage, and other services for 
maintaining the defendants' boats and all boats secured within 
the GCNRA are managed by a concessioner of NPS. 
The trial court held that although federal registration 
of boating activity within the GCNRA is "extensive, even 
pervasive" (R. 166), there has been no identification of "any 
conflict between federal laws and regulations and the state laws 
in question." Further, the trial court concluded that the 
property taxes that must be paid by the defendants to register 
their boats for use on Lake Powell are dedicated "to support the 
general function of government, not the enforcement of particular 
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laws" and that such tax requirements do not have to be in a 
"direct quid pro quo relationship between revenues and 
expenditures." (R. 167). 
B. CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS HAVE PREEMPTED 
THE STATE FROM REGULATING BOAT REGISTRATION WITHIN THE 
GCNRA. 
State laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the 
laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution," are 
preempted and invalid. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 
U.S. 597, 604 (1991). It is well established that Congress has 
the power to preempt state law in a given area. Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). 
State law may be preempted by express congressional statement, by 
federal occupation of the field, or by direct conflict with 
federal law. Integrity Management Int'l, Inc. v. Tombs & Sons, 
Inc., 836 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1987); Patten v. Lederle Lab., 655 
F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1987). Such exercise is a matter of 
intent of Congress, and the issue is resolved by an analysis of 
that intent. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn. 375 U.S. 96, 103 
(1963) . 
The court must determine congressional intent based on 
its analysis of the general purposes of the federal statute and 
the relationship between those general purposes and the state 
action at issue. Such a purpose may be evidenced in several 
ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
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State to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field 
in which the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. [Or] the object 
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of 
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Or the 
state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective 
of the federal statute. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947). When explicit preemptory language is 
absent, Congress's intent to totally supplant state law, or 
"preempt the field," may be implicit where a "scheme of federal 
regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it, 
"where an " [a]ct of Congress [touches] a field in which the 
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject," or where "the object sought to be obtained by the 
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may 
reveal the same purpose" to preempt state authority. Pacific Gas 
& Electric Co., 461 U.S. 190 at 203-04. 
Stated another way, any state law is potentially 
subject to preemption by federal law under any of the following 
three theories: (1) state regulations in areas left unregulated 
by Congress where the state regulation may nevertheless violate 
the Commerce Clause. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 
U.S. 617 (1978); (2) when Congress legislates within a legitimate 
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sphere of authority, the Supremacy Clause empowers Congress 
explicitly to preempt state regulation in that area. (For 
example, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 
42 U.S.C. § 6929, explicitly preempts state waste handling laws 
that are less stringent than the federal controls; and, (3) even 
when Congress does not explicitly preempt all state regulation in 
a given field, the federal statutory scheme may impliedly preempt 
a particular state regulation. Hines v. Davidowitzf 312 U.S. 52 
(1941). 
When Congress has expressed an extensive interest in an 
activity that has interstate ramifications or where there is a 
unique federal interest, it can be judicially found that federal 
regulation in that circumstance may supersede state regulation. 
This circumstance is most likely to exist when, among other 
things, federal regulation can prevent burdens on interstate 
commerce. Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 Yale J. Reg. 93, 
96-110 (1983) . 
1. Preemption Has Occurred Through Express 
Congressional Statement. 
The Maritime Laws Revision Act of 1984, P.L. 
98-89, as cofidied at 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301, et seq., and 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 13101, et seq.. incorporates numerous federally mandated 
safety requirements to be imposed by either federal or state 
officials. This act applies to all recreational vessels and 
assorted equipment operating on waters subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. At 46 U.S.C. § 4306, Congress 
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expressly barred states from enforcing their own recreational 
vessel performance and safety standards. The savings clause in 
the act may not preserve a state law or regulation which 
conflicts with the objectives of a federal law, even if it is 
possible to comply with both. Shields v. Outdoor Marine Corp., 
776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991) ; also see Mowery v. Mc- ^ ary 
Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 
1991). 
46 U.S.C. §§ 13101, et seq.. covers many of the 
same activities as the Utah Boating Act, such as reporting to an 
advisory council, identification, safety responsibilities, safety 
devices, and the like. Regulations developed by the Secretary at 
Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, in combination with the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq., provide 
an adjudicatory process, and in addition the regulations cover 
the same activities as the State's regulations concerning 
waterway marking systems, zoning of waters, identification of 
boats, safety devices, and the like. Coast Guard regulations 
deal with many of the same safety issues as the Department of the 
Interior and the State. See 33 C.F.R. Part 2, 33 C.F.R. 
§ 3.55-10(b), 33 C.F.R. § 5.03 and 33 C.F.R. § 110.127a. The 
Department of the Interior defers to the Coast Guard' authority 
when their regulations conflict (36 C.F.R. § 3.1), but it is 
apparent that the federal agencies intended to coordinate so as 
to effectively cover water safety within the GCNRA. 
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Congress gave the Coast Guard the exclusive 
authority to establish safety regulations for pleasure boats and 
explicitly provided that all State regulations not identical to 
federal rules were invalid. 46 TJ.S.C. § 4306. 'Where the Coast 
Guard declines to adopt regulations requiring a certain safety 
device covering a certain instance the state cannot adopt its own 
safety device. Shields v. Outdoor Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 
1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991). 
Nothing in the Federal boat safety laws, the Coast 
Guard laws and regulations or the laws administered by the 
Secretary of the Interior confer jurisdiction upon the states to 
regulate boating activities within the GCNRA. 
Additionally, the 1944 Flood Control Act, 58 Stat. 
887, read as a whole, envisioned a scheme of federal, not state, 
regulation over federal projects involving interstate navigable 
rivers where the federal projects were a part of a scheme for the 
entire river. See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South 
Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 825 n.23 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 
U.S. 1042, 104 S. Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d 171. 
2• The Trial Court Erred in Finding No Conflict 
Between Federal and State Laws. 
The trial court said that the defendants "have not 
. . . identified any conflict between federal laws and 
regulations and the state laws in question here." That court 
interpreted that to uphold the defendants' claim the court must 
find "whether compliance with the questioned state law would 
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prevent or impede compliance with federal laws or regulations." 
The court found that the defendants' assertion that the 
registration requirements of Utah law would discourage use of the 
Utah portion of Lake Powell was "speculative, remote and 
insubstantial." 
At conflict in the instant case are the Division's 
attempts to enforce the Utah Boating Act and the Secretary of the 
Interior and the Secretary of Transportation enforcement of 
regulations governing a broad panoply of activities within the 
Recreation Area, including boating. Specifically, both of the 
federal agencies require the boat owner within the GCNRA to 
display an identification number on the hull of each vessel, 
36 C.F.R. § 3.1, before such boat may be operated within the 
GCNRA. This simple requirement directly conflicts with the 
State's requirement that every such boat have both the 
identification number either issued by the Coast Guard or by the 
State, and a certificate from the county assessor that the owner 
has paid the property tax on the boat. The State's tax 
requirement has nothing to do with boater safety or 
identification for law enforcement purposes. The tax requirement 
adds burdens to the use of the federal facility. This burden has 
not been specifically authorized by Congress. 
The impact upon the boat owner to obtain the 
county assessor's approval is significant. Although the minimum 
tax on a $500 boat is only $8.50, as a practical matter the 
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values of the boats at Lake Powell are far greater and thus the 
tax is proportionately greater. The amount of the tax is based 
on the "percent good" factor against the original cost new or the 
F.O.B. or P.O.E. price from the ABOS Marine Blue Book. R884 24P 
33E.17. It would be fair to conclude that the tax would amount 
to hundreds of dollars, and in many instances, thousands of 
dollars each year. This cost to operate a boat at Lake Powell is 
substantially more than in the surrounding states of Nevada, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution invalidates all state laws that conflict or 
interfere with acts of Congress and mandates that federal 
statutes and federal regulations take precedence over state laws. 
Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 107 S. Ct. 334 (1986); 
Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Martinez, 772 F. Supp. 1263 
(S.D. Fla. 1991). States may not circumscribe or impair 
federally protected rights. Mun. Utilities Bd. of Albertville v. 
Alabama Power Co., 34 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991). 
Even where the preemptive intent by Congress is 
not inferential, "state law is nullified to the extent that it 
actually 'conflicts' with federal law." Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 471 U.S. 707 
(1985). The United States Supreme Court has described two 
situations where the conflict rule may come into play. In 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 464 U.S. 238 
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(1984), and in Pacific Gas £ Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983), the -urt 
noted that a conflict could occur where concurrent complin „e 
with both the federal and state or local regulation of a matter 
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress." 
Federal regulations can preempt state laws as 
effectively as federal statutes. Hillsborough, supra. Where 
conflicts arise between federal regulations and state and local 
regulations regarding public lands, the latter are preempted. 
City and County of Denver by and Through Bd. of Water Comm'rs v. 
Bergland, 517 F. Supp. 155, Judgment aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 695 F.2d 465, 19 ERC 1443 (10th Cir. Colo., Dec. 09, 1982). 
"It is settled that when Congress acts upon the 
subject all state laws covering the same field are necessarily 
superseded by reason of the supremacy of the national authority." 
New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield. 244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917). 
Where the states and Congress have concurrent power, "that of the 
State [was] superseded when the power of Congress [over 
interstate commerce was] exercised." Southern Railway v. Reid. 
222 U.S. 424, 436 (1912). 
C. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OCCUPIES THE FIELD OF INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE WITHIN THE GCNRA. 
Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent 
to supersede state law altogether may be found from a scheme of 
federal regulation from which it may be implied that such 
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regulation is sufficiently comprehensive or pervasive to make it 
appear that Congress "left no room" for supplementation by state 
or local laws. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy 
Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 
203-204 (1983). "It must follow in consequence of the action of 
Congress . . . that the power of the State over the subject 
matter ceased to exist from the moment that Congress exerted its 
paramount and all-embracing authority over the subject. We say 
this because the elementary and long settled doctrine is that 
there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce and 
that the regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme." 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers 
Elevator Co.. 226 U.S. 426, 435 (1913). Preemption may be 
implicit if a scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it," if "the Act of Congress . . . touch[es] 
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the 
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject," or if the goals "sought to be 
obtained" and the "obligations imposed" reveal a purpose to 
preclude state authority. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical 
Lab. , Inc.. 105 S. Ct. 2371, 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
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23 8 (1984) . Preemption may also be found where state legislation 
would impede purposes and objectives of Congress. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, N.C.. 107 S. Ct. 499 (1986). A 
Corps of Engineers dam and reservoir that is part of a system of 
dams and reservoirs within a multi-state area precluded a state's 
fish and game department froir enforcing its own laws within the 
lands taken for dam and reservoir purposes. Lower Brule Sioux 
Tribe v. State of South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 826 (8th Cir. 
1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042, 104 S. Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d 
171; Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of South Dakota v. United States, 
712 F.2d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 1983). In these cases, the court 
examined the Missouri River as an interrelated unitary system of 
dams and reservoirs, much like the Colorado River insofar as the 
federal projects acted together to provide flood control, 
irrigation and power development. The court was convinced by the 
need of the Secretary of the Army to have total control of the 
taken area so that the purposes of the taking could be 
accomplished without interference from the state and the local 
Indian tribe. Such is the teaching that is applicable to the 
instant case. 
Similarly, in State of South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 
S. Ct. 2309 (1993), the state challenged the authority of an 
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing on public lands 
taken by the Corps of Engineers for dam and reservoir purposes. 
The court construed the 1944 Flood Control Act as authorizing 
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public recreational facilities on the lands taken for a Corps of 
Engineers reservoir located on the Missouri River. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 460d. The Supreme Court construed the Flood Control Act as 
affirmatively allowing the public to hunt and fish on such lands, 
subject to federal regulation. The Bourland court concluded that 
when Congress broadly opens such land to the public, the effect 
of the transfer is the destruction of pre-existing regulatory 
control. The court did not address whether South Dakota had 
concurrent regulatory control over hunting and fishing in the 
taken area. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2318, note 12. 
Whether activities within a navigable stream are 
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction requires an evaluation 
of the nature of the matter to determine whether the federal 
interest is exclusive of the state. Navigable waters of the 
United States are deemed as "public property of the nation, and 
subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress." Wyandotte 
Transp. Co. v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 379, 389 U.S. 191, 201 
(1967). The federal government is thus charged with insuring 
that navigable waterways and other routes of commerce remain free 
of obstruction. Implicit with this federal power is the power to 
prevent all obstructions, whether the obstruction is a physical 
one or one imposed by unauthorized jurisdictional intrusions by 
state agencies. 
The Colorado River has received extensive federal 
legislative and executive branch attention to further national 
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objectives that are traditionally outside of the state 
experience, i.e. electrical power development, irrigation, flood 
control, navigation, water storage, international treaty 
performance, recreation and other purposes intended for the 
national interest. The principal beneficiaries were uniquely 
federal. 
In Bilderback v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 903 (D. 
Or. 1982), the national forest land was determined to not be 
governed by the state's livestock open range law due to the 
pervasive and detailed federal law governing grazing in the 
national forests. In this instance the federal law had not 
required the fencing of livestock within the national forest, 
whereas state law would have required the owner of the livestock 
to be responsible for fencing in his livestock. The trial court 
concluded that the federal government's pervasive grazing laws 
preempted the state's open range law. 
The Secretary has promulgated extensive regulations at 
chapter I, Part 3 of Title 3 6 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
within which the Secretary extends pervasive controls over the 
above activities occurring within the national parks in general 
and the GCNRA in specific. These controls include, preservation 
of natural, cultural and archeological resources, providing 
wildlife protection, fishing, law enforcement, camping, 
picnicking, fire control, sanitation, animal control, airports, 
motor vehicles, regulating boating, smoking, trespassing, 
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alcoholic beverages, gambling, soliciting, use of explosives, 
special events, meetings and gatherings, swimming, traffic 
control, signage, drinking water, public accommodations, visitor 
information, roads, commercial and private operations, labor 
standards, minerals management, cemeteries, grazing, commercial 
fishing, contracts and permits, inspections, safety regulations, 
historic preservation, and the like. Further, the Secretary 
collects fees from users to pay for the services that the 
Department and the NPS render to the public. 
To facilitate the providing of recreational services 
provided by the NPS and its concessioner to the Area, the GCNRA 
has entered into various cooperative agreements with other 
federal and Indian tribal agencies, including the BLM, the Navajo 
Nation, the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), U.S. Geological Survey 
("USGS"), Canyonlands National Park, the Coast Guard, with the 
States of Utah and Arizona, with the City of Page, Arizona, with 
the counties of Garfield, Kane, and Wayne in Utah, and Coconino 
County in Arizona, with a private emergency medical services 
provider, with two universities, and with Bullfrog Resort and 
Marina, Inc. 
The agreements between NPS and the state and local 
agencies pertain to a broad range of activities pertaining to 
wildlife, boating safety administration, the use of radio 
frequencies, investigative roles of NPS commissioned officers in 
relation to state and local agencies, deputization of park 
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rangers by Garfield County sheriff, investigative roles of NPS 
commissioned officers in relation to Kane and Coconino counties' 
sheriffs' offices, use of Coconino County's sheriff's office 
radio frequency, use of Arizona lake improvement funds for 
construction of Wahweap visitor use facilities, deputization of 
Arizona public safety personnel as National Park Service Special 
Police Officers, programmatic agreement regarding the 
preservation of historic places and objects, and use of Arizona 
telecommunications site. A listing of some of the agreements 
among the GCNRA and the various federal agencies, Indian tribes, 
states, local governments, and private entities are found at 
90-96 of the record. 
Although the education of students in grades K-12 is 
normally the function of the state, even the new K-12 school at 
Bullfrog within the GCNRA will be funded through the construction 
set-aside program of the National Park Service and the buildings 
will be the property of the NPS. The NPS has signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Kane County School District whereby the 
District has agreed to operate the school programs, pay for all 
utilities, and all maintenance costs of the school. The school 
primarily will service children living in the Halls Crossing and 
Bullfrog areas. Faculty will be housed at the school site. 
Other memoranda of understandings exist between the NPS 
and the Division of Wildlife Resources, including an April 27, 
1993 agreement under which the GCNRA provides to the stace three 
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boat slips at Wahweap and one slip at Bullfrog, the use of 
various support facilities and to maintain the access to the 
State's Stateline facility. A June 10, 1993 agreement with the 
Division requires both parties to not take any action affecting 
wildlife without consultation with the other, and acting with 
respect to wildlife in accordance with NPS standards. 
The NPS also has an agreement with the Utah Highway 
Patrol ("UHP11) dated May 19, 1993 which grants UHP access to 
radio communications frequencies under certain conditions, 
although net control is maintained by the NPS. 
The NPS's agreement with the Utah Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Energy, provides that the NPS will install 
various electrical paraphernalia to monitor electrical demands 
and other functions wherein the information will be shared with 
the State. The State will use federal funds and other state 
controlled funds. 
There simply is no room for independent state action 
within the GCNRA. Any state action must depend upon cooperative 
independent agreements with the Department of the Interior and 
Transportation agencies. 
D. NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE ADVANCED BY EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL 
REGULATION IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE. 
The choice of whether state or federal law ought to 
apply in a given instance depends on three factors: "whether 
there is need for a nationally uniform body of law to apply in 
situations capable to this, whether application of state law 
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would frustrate federal policy or functions, and the impact a 
federal rule might have on existing relationships under state 
law." United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 
(1979). The need for uniformity should be assessed in terms of 
Congress' intent at the time of the passage of the act. Leo 
Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 681-82 & n. 18 (1979). 
Congress and the Supreme Court have been consistent 
since the early part of the twentieth century in treating the 
entire length of the River as an integrated interstate unit 
intended to serve the multi-purpose water and recreation needs of 
a large region of the Nation and to meet the Nation's 
international obligations. Lake Powell is the heart for 
accomplishing these national objectives. It would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of Congress if each of the seven 
states affected by the Colorado River had the authority to impose 
its own unique requirements upon river recreationists that 
created disparity in access to the river's benefits. 
State law is impliedly preempted when, even though it 
does not conflict with a federal statute, it would unduly 
frustrate the purposes of that statute to permit concurrent state 
regulation. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Perez v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Gade v. National Solid Wastes 
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). The interstate nature of 
the GCNRA and Lake r. 1, as well as the isolated location of 
PICKETT\PLBADING\Brief.UCA -25-
these federal facilities, compel the need for uniform national 
regulations. 
Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 18, to authorize actions, which in themselves, are not 
within Congress' express Article I powers, but serve to 
effectuate other policies within the express powers. "Let the 
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end . . . are constitutional." 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). In an 
interstate context the courts have found it reasonable to require 
uniformity in regulations in order to achieve uniformity and 
equality in services for the intended users of the interstate 
facility. "It seems to us that the congressional purpose can be 
achieved only if a uniform federal law governs as to the 
standards of service which the carrier must provide and as to the 
extent of liability for failure to comply with such standards." 
Cooperative Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 867 F.Supp. 1511, 
1517, citing Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). 
The interstate character of Lake Powell, the national 
and international importance of the river and its water projects, 
and the extensive, even pervasive, federal regulatory presence, 
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compel that there be uniformity and equality in regulating access 
and use of these federal waters. 
E. THE STATE'S BOAT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT THAT PROPERTY 
TAX BE PAID BEFORE BOAT OWNER MAY USE THE WATERS OF 
LAKE POWELL VIOLATES THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
In the case at hand, non-resident defendants who desire 
to use the federally provided boat facilities for more than 14 
days each year at federally developed, operated and maintained 
Lake Powell provided by the federal government do not use the 
waters within the State outside of the GCNRA in that period. 
Nonetheless, each is compelled by the State to pay the 
substantial property tax on his/her boat or face the penalties of 
the Utah Boating Act, including non-use of the Lake and having 
the boat seized and sold. The State requires this 
notwithstanding that it provides only nominal services to the 
defendants. 
The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which 
exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; 
but does not extend to those means which are employed by Congress 
to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the 
people of the United States. Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 
117 U.S. 151-155 (1886) . The states have no power, by taxation 
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner 
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by 
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general 
government. Van Brocklin at 156. State tax does not violate 
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dormant commerce clause when tax is applied to activity with 
substantial nexus with taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does 
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly 
related to services provided by the state. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n 
v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995); Insinger Mach. 
Co. v. Philadelphia Tax Review Bd,, 645 A.2d 365, cert, denied, 
657 A.2d 494 (1994) . 
The United States may perform its functions without 
conforming to the police regulations of a state. Arizona v. 
California, 283 U.S. 423, 451 (1931). Congress must consent 
expressly and affirmatively to state or local actions that 
"impose substantial burdens" on interstate or foreign commerce. 
South Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-2 
(1984). The Commerce Clause even without implementing 
legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the 
States. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). For state 
to impose tax on activity consistent with commerce clause and due 
process clause, there must be connection to activity itself, 
rather than connection only to actors state seeks to tax. Allied 
Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. Of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992). 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 
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362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960). If a legitimate local purpose is 
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent 
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the 
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well ^'th a lesser impact on interstate activities. 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) . Even if a 
local activity is appropriate to be regulated in the interest of 
safety, health and well-being of the community, a regulation that 
impedes interstate or foreign commerce may be found in violation 
if reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to 
conserve legitimate local interests, are available. Dean Milk 
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
Under the Utah Property Tax Act, § 59-2-301, t- mty 
assessor assesses all boats located within the county. U U . 
Administrative Code at R884 24P 33. The assessor assesses and 
collects the personal property tax on boats based on the "percent 
good" factor against the original cost new or the F.O.B. or 
P.O.E. price from the ABOS Marine Blue Book. Boats have a 
minimum value of $500 and a minimum tax of $8.50. R884 24P 33. 
Registration of that personal property may not be completed 
unless the uniform fee has been paid, even if the taxpayer is 
appealing the uniform fee valuation. If the ov of the 
personal property registered in Utah is domiciled outside of 
Utah, the taxable situs of the property is presumed to be the 
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county in which the uniform fee was paid, unless an assessor's 
affidavit establishes otherwise. Id. 
All revenue collected by the county under the local 
levy in excess of its approved budget for assessment, collection, 
and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal programs 
is "transmitted to the state treasure" and is redistributed to 
counties having tax collection budget shortfalls "in accordance 
with the certified [tax collection] budgets." U.C.A. 
§ 17-19-15(6) (1994). 
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that "[a]11 tangible property in the state, not exempt under the 
laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to 
be ascertained as provided by law." 
All corporation or persons in this State, or doing 
business herein, are subject to taxation for State, County, 
School, Municipal or other purposes, on the real and personal 
property owned or used by them within the Territorial limits of 
the authority levying the tax. Article XIII, § 10. 
Boats as ". . . watercraft . . . not otherwise exempt 
under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution, 
may be exempted from taxation as property by the Legislature. . . 
that is required by law to be registered with the state before it 
is used on a public highway, on a public waterway, on public 
land, or in the air." Article XIII, § 14. 
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Every tax has the effect of a judgment against the 
person, and every lien created by the tax laws has the force and 
effect of an execution duly levied against all personal property 
of the delinquent. The judgment is not satisfied nor the lien 
removed until the taxes are paid or the property sold for the 
payment of the judgment or lien. U.C.A. § 59-2-1301. The county 
has the right to sell the property to satisfy its tax lien. 
U.C.A. § 59-2-1303. See also Fisher v. Wright, 123 P.2d 703 
(Utah 1942) . 
1. The Substantially Greater Burden Imposed By 
Utah's Boat Registration Requirements As 
Compared To Surrounding States' Burdens 
Impermissibly Interferes With Interstate 
Commerce. 
Surrounding states have much less onerous boat 
registration laws. Nevada requires the boat owner to pay a 
minimum fee of $15, plus a certain fee for the length of the boat 
ranging in cost from $10 for less than 13 feet to $75 for 31 feet 
or more. N.R.S. § 488.075. The owner is exempted from obtaining 
such a permit if he/she already is covered by a number issued to 
it by operative federal law or a federally approved numbering 
system of another state for 90 days. N.R.S. § 488.085. If a 
federal agency of the United States has in force a system of 
identification numbering system for motorboats, the state's plan 
must conform with the federal plan. N.R.S. § 488.105. 
The State of Colorado requires the payment of a 
nominal fee and recognizes that vessels numbered in accordance 
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with applicable federal law or in accordance with a federally 
approved numbering system of another state will be recognized up 
to 60 days. C.R.S. § 33-13-103. 
Likewise, the State of New Mexico requires the 
payment of a nominal fee and recognizes that vessels numbered in 
accordance with applicable federal law require that the state 
agency conform to the federal system. N.M.S. §§ 66-12-5 and 
66-12-5.1. The State of Arizona requires residents to pay a 
registration fee of four dollars, plus a tax of $.45 per foot of 
the boat and non-residents to pay ten dollars and a tax of one 
dollar and forty-five cents per foot. A.R.S. §§ 5-321A.1 and 
A.2. The registration requirements of these states stand in 
stark contrast to the Utah Boating Act. 
In Bibb v. Navaio Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 
(1959), an Illinois law required trucks to have contour mud 
flaps. The Court found that the Illinois law hopelessly 
conflicted with an Arkansas law that required straight mud flaps. 
Because it was physically impossible for an interstate truck to 
comply with the mud flaps of both states, the Court concluded 
that the idiosyncratic and empirically unsupported Illinois law 
could not stand. The Court will overturn a state law burdening 
interstate commerce when it finds an actual, present conflict 
between that law and the law of another state that affects the 
same instrumentalities of commerce. Also see Huron Portland 
Cement Co.. 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
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The boater registration requirements of Utah are 
at such variance with the laws of the surrounding states, 
especially Ar zona which shares the same interstate Lake Powell, 
that Utah's registration law must be found to impermissibly 
burdens interstate commerce when Utah's law is applied on Lake 
Powell or within the GCNRA. 
2. The Utah Boat Registration Requirement to Pay 
Property Tax Is Clearly Excessive In Relation 
To Local Benefits. 
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. 137 at 
142. 
The state is free to pursue its own fiscal 
policies, . . . if by the practical operation of a tax the state 
exerts its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, 
to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has 
conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society. 
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) . 
Also, each state may tax all property, real or 
personal, within its borders, belonging to persons or 
corporations, although employed in interstate commerce, providing 
the rights and powers of a national government are not interfered 
with. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U.S. 14 (1896). 
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"Substantial nexus" requirement 1 
commerce °'.au?- --- rate's ability to * - i-s*ate entity is 
••• •' imposes v" * :>- due 
;.r.)c-ss Clause ij\r , -1:1-1 .-, ?i.-_- ;....- ... : . J i i . m g . L . . •_ 
int^rsta4"^ commerce. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota By and Through 
Heitkanu G * '• : - -
:«c:* instancing the authority of t-be state to 
r"-Tire Derscr:c / 1 s -?-'<•-- r.-^ xus netween -he * activ.ty and t.ne 
. . 1 1 in 1 I T 1 * " *" les wnere 
.her- it :••» definite -.in-., :i- r jiimun. ..an- ..:. 10:; o..ir^cient to 
sat-Lf*'* i1 :^  rrocess .- -au : remen- - , Miller Bros. Co. v. State of 
Maryland, ' I > 
"nexus between such : tax and \ ransacc L U H ^ '- ^ uii ^ bidit or 
cue Lax is an extraction " State of Wisconsin v. 
J.C. Penney & Co., ' . 1 '' 1 1" 1 1"J J11) . 
CONCLUSION 
:' -" "• 01 congressional acts, executive orders, public 
land ordeic , erp*"ate compacts . " ." . :i ntei: 1 iat::i c:>] 1a 1 
treaty, federal execut:>- r:iar/ 1 1 . es an": regulations, and 
* >-i- "^'iLive ag-r™/ rd ^n^r r d<- '-ior^ have arguably 
made :rit _^-w- ^ : ^iver 
States. Every acre-foot r wa^er for consumptive .;se :.s 
states and Mexico. Var:^u- : >o-=ects 
d u ' . i . o r i z e : , . .- . .-i-r ^ ^ t h » f l o w i n g o r 2 mpomicJed wdiei JUI 
i r r iga te ; . , ^ a - i : generatici , recreation, wi ld l i fe enhancement, 
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archeological and historical preservation, grazing, protection of 
Indian religious values, protection of Indian monuments, fish, 
wildlife, and rare plants protection, protection of certain 
species, protection of wilderness, protection of water quality, 
protection or mitigation of wetlands, land conservation, 
floodplain management, and other purposes. 
The states have no power to retard, impede, burden, or in 
any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws 
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in 
the general government. Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 
U.S. 151 (1886). Thus, when Congress authorized federal agencies 
to withdraw existing public lands from the public domain for dam, 
reservoir, and recreation purposes, to acquire non-federal lands 
within the Area for those purposes and then later authorized the 
acquisition of more lands for recreation related purposes, and 
yet again authorized the exchange of state lands for federal 
lands outside the Area, it made its intent clear. Congress 
intended that the United States control all of the lands and 
waters within the vicinity of the dam, reservoir (Lake Powell), 
and the lands surrounding it so that the federal agencies 
responsible for those federal projects on such lands could 
execute their responsibilities without interference by the state. 
Further, it is evident that Congress intended that the user 
public would be likewise free from interference from the State. 
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As a resul ..: he per - . . * . ^ 
and the regulations ;.omulyated pursuant to those acts, the State 
x
 jice
 Upon th~ defendants the requirements 
..: ' ie ULdi. Piopei* lax A^t as a c... - I mil I i 111, i i nj Lite federal 
privileges w:" r.. r. ,e GCNRA. 
:
~~' * / 01 August, 1996. 
Dennis Iekes 
of PARRY MURRAY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day of August, 1996, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF by 
hand delivering the same to the following: 
Clerk of the Court Original 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Christine F. Soltis, Esq. Copy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Norman K. Johnson, Esq. Copy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
A copy of the same was delivered by United States Postal Service, 
first class mail prepaid, to: 
Craig C. Halls, Esq. Copy 
San Juan County Attorney 
297 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 850 
Monticello, UTU 84535 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COUR. 
§ar ''p*-County 
FILED FEB - I 1996 
CUtHivur ?hfc COURT 
sy 
"T^FT^fv" 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
CONRAD STERKEL, MEL G. CAHO, 
WILLIAM A. PICKETT, ALAN L. 
HERMAN, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 9417-156, 9417-
172, 9417-197, and 9417-200 
Defendants in these cases have moved to dismiss the charges 
filed against them for failing to register their boats. Each has 
demonstrated, and the state concedes, that the boats were 
maintained and operated within the confines of the Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area (lfGCNRA,f) . 
The court has reviewed all of the memoranda filed by counsel. 
After initially requesting oral argument, counsel for the 
defendants notified the court on January 29, 1996, that oral 
argument was waived. 
Defendants maintain that the land within GCNRA is exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the United States and that the laws of 
the State of Utah are without any force there. Alternatively, if 
there is some state jurisdiction within GCNRA it cannot extend to 
requiring defendants to register and pay taxes on their boats 
located there. 
Defendants have failed to persuade the court that Congress 
intended to divest the State of Utah generally of its power to 
enforce state laws within GCNRA. They have not identified any 
express legislative language effecting a divestit re. Absent any 
express statement, the court has no need to determine if Congress 
has the power to divest Utah of jurisdiction. Utah has 
jurisdiction to enforce its laws except as preempted by Congress 
exercising its powers under the Property Clause. 
The state concedes that, even though federal jurisdiction over 
GCNRA is not exclusive, Congress has the power under the Property 
Clause to preempt state laws that interfere with federal regulation 
of federal property. The state also concedes that such preemption 
need not be explicit, if interference with federal goals is 
evident. Since defendants nave not identified any explicit: 
congressional preemption of the state's boating registration laws, 
their preemption claim must rest on actual interference. 
Defendants have demonstrated that federal regulation of 
boating activity within GCNRA is extensive, even pervasive. They 
have not, however, identified any conflict between federal laws and 
regulations and the state laws in question here. The question, as 
this court understands it, is whether compliance with the 
questioned state law would prevent or impede compliance with 
federal laws or regulations. Defendants have not identified any 
such interference. They suggest that enforcement of the 
registration — and related taxation — requirements of Utah law 
may discourage them from leaving their boats at GCNRA, discourage 
2 
il I firui^ or encourage some owners to change the place 
looring. Those effects are sp< i • u 1 JI J vr
 f J vw«11 .111" I 
insubstantial. The court declines to rest a finding of preemption 
considering the preemption claim, I In. i.'i. nil In il  
significant the absence of any federal participation jn these 
ist Guard nre 
apparently not concerned that enforcement .:i 11r s regi ^  11 d! 1111 
laws would impair their effective regulation of boating activity 
Finally, the court addresses the related Commerce clause 
argument of defendant? *•- ^ related to preemption claim,. 
is separate ana uase i las 
limits Defendants claim that the i«u» -,iicn. ne? ,»^^
 K . 
order In register their boats are not fairly r e n t e d : ervices 
provided with. 
Defendants mistake the purpose of property taxes Property 
taxes collected to support the general function of government, 
not the enforcement c\ partic ulai laws 'i'i i, .i.iic i HI I I i 
obligation provide general government services, such as Jctw 
enfnrrempr , if 'ir i services, and education, in i in in GCNRA. n is 
not required demonstrate a ilirec I. yi .J yi_j j u u i t~ • 1 > i I • ..i«, I. .,) 
between revenues and expenditures. The Commerce Clause cl aim must 
tii"'TPf i I "! i I as well. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The parties are 
directed to appear before the court on February 29, 1996, at 9:30 
a.m. to set their trial dates and address any additional pre-trial 
issues. 
DATED the M. of January, 1996. 
'A^ 
Distfrzct Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage 
prepaid, this ffi day of < W I H 1996, to the following: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Mr. R. Dennis I ekes 
Attorney for Defendants 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Deputy Court Clerk 
4 
1 i 
f
 / / 4^^J2 
^if^ust 19, 1 " 
The Honorable Judge Andeison 
Seventh District Court 
I .0. Box 6>-
SEVENThUlSlHiGl CUUR I' 
San Juan County 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
P - a i S Deputy 
'NILS letter _. Leing w: . : ' c * i nc^i n \ n
 r, t i\\\ ! ark 
H O . B892007 (Attachment A .:.,•;!. ! presented Tla 
office yesterday, August 18, 1994 at 11:15 A.M. At 
1
 -
1
-- nosted the $74.00 bail alonr uiin a pie. o 
M n c e my home in Colorado is 325 miles Irom tjif 
court was in session at the time, Ila suggested tha 
letter when I got home. IF it pleases i U~
 r ..,,. _ 
. , case, as f r, \ • * s ; 
s citation 
in your 
t hat tim«-
tri ' s 
1.) 
2.) 
3.) 
4 . ) 
I pui ( hased a II nil" lite Yatlil Home boat in May of /, :-
and it has been stored in a covered slip at Hall's 
Crossing Marina since that time. This boat has aJwav 
carried a Colorado registration and, until May of 1 9c* *- , 
I had never received notification of any kind from tIn-
State of Utah or the National Park Service that iu -t 
was improperly registered. 
My iinpression has a 1 ways been that, since Lake Powe 11 
is in a National. Park: and since it lies in more than 
one State, the National Park Service must have official 
jurisdiction on boating as they do on the operation 
the the marinas and other thi rigs. - I believe this is i ;•-< 
reason a high percentage of the boats on this lake h-
been registered in Arizona and Colorado ever since 
have been there. 
i renewed inj t • 
Attachment B ) . 
;istration on Jan. 20, 19 9 4 
In May ol * - f ; ' i \ : - 5 f-ttci
 t , 'tat v of 
Utah dated May _ , lww< , .\ t * -. hment ]) and mailed on 
May 9, 1994 (Attachment D) . Please note that thi<= lo r 
was written after the 1993 Colorado registration 
expiration date of Dec. 31, 1993 as well as the Utah 
registration expiration date of April 30, 1994, 1 ,:u 
not think it was proper for the State of Utah to declare 
in their very first, noti f i c a t i o n t h at ' vo u j ^ he :. s s •; e d 
a citation for this violation "'effective immediately" 
11 see in s a 1 in o s t i in p - - ' -•' M e to me to have a 4 5 1 boat 
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removed from this lake and to find an alternate location 
for storage on a moment's notice. Therefore, I feel the 
State of Utah is not acting in a fair and proper manner. 
5.) Since I live over 400 miles from Hall!s Crossing and 
for various other reasons, I made my first trip to the 
lake on August 12, 1994. I did not take my boat out of 
the slip as I wanted to first talk to some other boat 
owners to determine what was going on. On August 14, 1994, 
I was on my boat which had still not been taken out of 
the slip when I was approached by four officers of Utah 
State Parks. They informed me that my boat was improperly 
registered. When I tola them my story basically as 
stated above and that I had not received their letter 
until May of 1994, one of the officers told me that I was 
wrong and that the letter was issued in February. Since 
I did not have a copy of the letter (Attachment C) with 
me, I had no proof. Even though I had never taken the 
boat from its slip in 1994 and was not operating the vessc 
then, the officer issued me the citation (Attachment A ) . 
6.) I have been boating and fishing on Lake Powell since 1978 
and have never even received a warning or any other 
citation for any violation during those 16 years. 
Your Honor, based on the above facts, I beg the court to find the 
following: 
THAT I should be permitted to operate my boat with my own 
State's registration in a National Park as long as I 
obey all rules and regulations of that National Park. 
THAT the citation was issued even though I have every 
intention of obeying the law and was not operating 
my boat in willful disregard of the law and therefore 
the citation should be dismissed. 
THAT my boat not be impounded before your ruling and not 
before I have reasonable time for compliance, if *ny, 
as set by the court. 
Thank you. If this letter is not sufficient for the court, I will 
testify under oath at the time and date specified by you. 
Yours tr 
Conrad Sterkel 
cc: Mr. Dave Harris 
Utah Parks & Rec 
Page, AZ 
Ranger-in-Charge 
A-irr, T±CU m/C v ? r-h 
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THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY GIVEN 
NOTICE TO APPEAR IN THE 
COURT OF '^W^*'*^ 
/3d/ ^ < ^ ^ C ^ * j / / <%™~/, Cd &*<&_ 
| UTAH DIVISION OF PARKS & RECREATION j f ^ 9 ^ I C A S E N 0 
S& CITATION NO B 8 9 2 U U / " 
LOCATED AT . 7^'/7'$r >'oo/:r 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
rb • ,w 
10 •' ictLLQ.UJ yqsztT 
PHONL YoQ^i-ai^ 
MUST APPEAR IN 
Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen 
(14) days after issuance of this citation 
COURT TIME £"6 DAY /n~r 
FOR COURT USE ONI \ 
OATf OF C ONVICTION/FORFEITURE _ 
PLEA/FINDING 
D Guilty 
D No Contest 
a Not Guilty 
O Forfeited Bail 
. S U S P E N O E D . 
. S U S P E N D E D . 
SEVERITY 
D Minimum 
D Intermediate 
U Maximum 
Signature of Judge or Clerk Required 
DLD 
USE 
\sr£ffi£L /C/J&4Q (Middle) 
Nddress (City) (State) (Zp) 
W ? ^VW/rr' CAK4, vfiiL CO, gl&fi 
Driver License No ar License INO _. > 
Picture ID 
D Yes t>No 
DOB I Social Security Number jHt / | Wt ^ J Hair J Eyes 
TOLO VT#nT&* \ZblO 
ehicfe Color I Vehicle Year I Vehicle Make J Type * 
Race 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING 
UT 
7J 
CO CY 
hiifkorf£*l /<66f$&Ar/0A/' 
FMU$ r,iMA)A F-$ 
~%W 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT 
TTffl 
Mile Post No 
IV'7(*) 
Interstate 
D Yes D No 
Speed) lino 
^5? 
Accident 
Y (H 
Misd 
x 
Direct ton 
N S E W 
MPH Over 
P R O M I S E TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED*HER£lN """ 
\ il 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO U W ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE 
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT/TO WHICH THE?DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR 
IS THE PROPERjCOURT PURSUANT TO SECTION ft/ 7 19 
 .C  
< OMPI AINANT 
DEFENDANT COPY Da,e Sem to DLD Docket No RIGHT INDEX 
/-h~Tlte~lfrn&nJ?-~' JO 
COLORADO BUAT REGISTRATION 
REGISTRATION NUMBER 
CL81718P 
EXPIRES ON 12/31/94. 57 
("CONRAD STERKEL 
1381 SHEEPHORN RD 
L 
BOND CO 80423 
~\ 
J 
MAKE 
1UNIPLITE 
MODEL 
rACHT HOME 
PROP 
IB 
LENGTH 
45 
HULL 
F 
USE 
P 
DATE OF BIRTH 
1 1 / 1 6 / 3 7 
HIN/VIN NUMBER 
UNF039Z1M84I 
TYPE 
ur 
FUEL 
G 
YEAR 
1984 
CCCMSP 
OWN^fSIGNATURE DATE PAID 
* T 
® 
Michael 0. Leavitt 
Governor 
Ted Stewart 
Executive Director 
Courtland Nelson 
Division Director 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF PARKS AND RECREATION 
A TTTH H^vf£**T" 
Southwest Region 
POBox 1079 
Cedar City, Utah 84721 -1079 
601-586-4497 
801-586-2789 (Fax) 
Dear Lake Powell Boat Owner, 
During a sm vey ol the slips and mooring buoys at Bullfrog and 
Halls Crossing, .i I'ussel registered to yoi i "was found to be in one 
of these areas, 
The purpose of this letter is to advise/warn you tuai - . ^ r vessel 
is in violation of Utah's boat registration law. Effective 
immediately, operators of your vessel will be issued a cj tation 
foi "operating an improperly registered vessel", 
Utah1's boat registration law i equires that any boat in Utah for 
more than 14 calendar days must be registered in Utah. If your 
vessel is Documented through the USCG, it is still required to be 
registered in Utah. Documentation does not exempt the vessel 
from registration, ",_r exempts the vessel f-rr '"- state 
numbering system. 
Please take this warning seriously and contact either the Kane 
County Boat Registration Office (Bullfrog Boats), or the San Juan 
County Boat Registration Office (Halls Crossing Boats), for the 
proper forms. 
If you have any questions concerning this information, please 
contact me at the address/phone number below. 
you nave already registered you vessel i. 
please disregard this letter. 
through April 
A 
, - U, 
Dave Harris 
Lake Powell, Ranger-In-Charge 
Utah Parks and Recreation 
PO Box 2586 
Page, AZ 86040 
602/645-2344 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF PARKS AND RECREATION 
Southwest Region 
PO Box 1079 
Cedar City. Utah 84721-1079 
an equal opportunity employer 
'7Tnkovhw&*,r~ ^ 
CONRAD STERKEL 
1381 SHEEPHORN RD 
BOND CO 80423 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COU 
San Juan County 
. L " h " T K RT 
Depui 
FHE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY GIVEN 
NOTICE TO APPEAR IN THE 
COURT OF.,.,. (JUP5E) 
LOCATED AT 
65L 
ynojuTitiLLQi of #H^b\ 
<Z0)l£S1~0/23 PHONE 
MUST APPEAR IN 
Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen 
(14) days after issuance of this citation. 
COURT TIME 2JL .DAY 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CON VICTI0N / FORFEITU RE 
FINE .__ 
JAIL 
. SUSPENDED . 
.SUSPENDED . 
PLEA/FINDING 
D Guilty 
D No Contest 
D Not Guilty 
D Forfeited Bail 
SEVERITY 
D Minimum 
D Intermediate 
D Maximum 
Signature of Judge or Clerk Required 
DLD 
USE 
UTAH DIVISION OF PARKS & RECREATION 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
CASE NO. 
CITATION NO. B892007 
(Last) 
5F6AK&-
(First) 
(City) 
60A?J*>4JO 
(Middle) 
P7/3 WMkf. LAA4 
Driver License No 
Picture f 
• Yes 
Kljf3%Q 
ire ft)I Vehicle Color 
(State) (Zip) 
DOB Social Security Number 
State 
COLO 
D Vehicle Color J Vehicle "tear I Vehicle Make J Type 
BONE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
Vehtde License No 
Ht . Wl l H « Hair 
t/00 
VLSniGf \Coto 
Eyes 
\01U 
Race 
'7J\ irn/'/toS&l /Z£6i$T/z#no/v 
"Ml& mAitofi F--f 
P\ 
tfr-7(i) 
interstate 
D Yes D No 
Direction 
N S E W 
Misd. 
Cit. 
X 
I CERTIFY THAT COPYOF THIS CITATION OR INFOmWWeKmS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE 
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW 
I FURTHER CERTIFY^fW THE COURTJO WHICH THW)EFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR 
IS THE PROPEFL/OUyrr P U R S U A N / T O SECTION /T7-19 
OFFICER no 
COMPLAINANT 
DATE. 
MISD. CIT. BCI 
TRAFFIC COURT 
Date Sent to DLD 
Y/7~/Sf #?J RIGHT INDEX 
San Juan County Attorney State of Utah 
CRAIG C HALLS 
P.O. Box 850 
Honticello. Utah 84535 
801-587-2128 or 2129 August 22, 1994 
PO fWt- Cr^J ZxqO. &**, ^ 4 -
US' 
Mr. William A. Pickett 
P.O. Box 1889 
Overton, NV 89040 
Dear Mr. Pickett: 
Attached please find a citation for Improper Registration of 
your Boat which is located at Halls Crossing, Utah. 
Section 73-18-7(1) requires that all boats located in Utah 
waters over 14 days must be registered. 
The fine for this citation is $74.00 and you must register 
and pay the taxes on this boat within 20 days from this date or 
your boat is subject to be seized and held until properly 
registered. 
Please send the fine of $74.00 and proof of current 
registation to the Clerk of the Court at P.O. Box 68, Monticello, 
Ut. 84535, within 20 days of this date or a formal information 
and a warrant for the seizure of the boat will be issued after that 
date. 
Thank you for your consideration in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Craig (g/. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
C: Clerk of the Court 
SEVEN] H DISTRICT COL 
San Juan County 
Deput 
DEFENDANT IS HEREBY GIVEN 
NOTICE TO APPEAR IN THE 
COURT OF 
LOCATED AT 
nn*rt*<xil» o+ m a r 
PHONE 
MUST APPEAR IN 
Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen 
(1(1) days after issuance of this citation. 
XJRT TIME ff^>
 nAY /fl~F 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE 
IAU 
.SUSPENDED . 
.SUSPENDED . 
PLEA/FINDING 
• Guilty 
• No Contest 
D Not Guilty 
• Forfeited Bail 
SEVERITY 
• Minimum 
D Intermediate 
• Maximum 
Signature of Judge or Clerk Required 
DLD 
USE 
yT A | | D f V | S | 0 N Q F p A R K § & R E C R £ A T i o } 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR © CASE NO. CITATION NO. B8897681 
(Last) 
ftCKMtr 
(First) 
U//M#rr\ 
Driver License No. 
Picture ID 
D Yes KfNo 
Social Security Number 
(Middle) 
TPP \^\y6miMffw^mm?H/ 
Eyes 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
UT I CO I CY I 
23 imAVbfieA. M6i5rKi4T/Q'Q 
Date 
Was MM wit 
ff-li ..32 Military Time \jToo 
TO APPEAR / 
Code # 
/e-y(0 
Interstate 
D Yes D No 
Speeding 
Accident 
Y N 
Misd. 
a t . 
z 
Traf. 
Direction 
N S E W 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE 
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAFmE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR 
IS THE PROPER COUflT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-1J 
OFFICER no 
COMPLAINANT . ID # _ 
MISD. CIT.-BCI 
TRAFFIC-COURT 
Date Sent to DLD 
RIGHT INDEX 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY GIVEN 
*-—
r
"-TCOriCE TO APPEAR IN THE 
COURT OF
 p u D ? ^ 
LOCATED AT 
ff)*>\\ct\lp C¥ MS& 
PHONE 
MUST APPEAR IN 
Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen 
(14) days after issuance of this citation. 
COURT TIME t l ^ DAY fflrtL 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE 
JAIL 
. SUSPENDED . 
. SUSPENDED . 
PLEA/FINDING 
D Guilty 
D No Contest 
• Not Guilty 
D Forfeited Bail 
SEVERITY 
D Minimum 
D Intermediate 
D Maximum 
Signature of Judge or Clerk Required 
UTAH DIVISION OF PARKS & RECREATION 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR & 
CASE NO 
QTATION NO. B889769 
(LastL 
Address ^ ' (City) " fStato) ^_JZ,P) l p 
Place of ftrth IDOB -I Social Security Number |Ht [~wl | Hair 
Driver License No 
DLD 
USE 
Picture ID 
D Yes (SfNo 
State 
(Middle) 
wm*g/y\7>z. 
U!p l't?'\1ffiV<MrriBtA"°~3i/ 
Eyes 
THE A&OVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
UT | CO | CY | 
21 imMorft #£6it>r#Ar/QA) 
•hriUSrt»v/yfr 
#-H jmiffi 
Mile Post No 
Code! 
Wffi 
Interstate 
D Yes G No 
Speeding 
ms\ 
Accident 
Y N 
Mtsd 
Qt 
Z 
Traf 
Direction 
N S E W 
MPHOvef 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS QTATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE 
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAFTRE COURT TO WHICH THE DEF^DANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR 
IS THE PROPER COgflf PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7 1} 
. ID# 
no 
COMPLAINANT . I D # . 
DATE_ ,19-
DEFENDANT COPY 
Date Sent to DLD Docket No 
RIGHT INDEX 
$&2 
,3*$&?L 
oM'HKXOIX B 
Appendix 
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN GLEN CANYON NATIONAL 
RECREATION AREA AND OTHER AGENCIES 
Between the Bureau of Land Management and Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Understanding relating to grazing in Glen 
Canyon National Recreation Area in the State of Arizona. 
Memorandum of Understanding for coordination of wilderness 
studies on adjacent Bureau of Land Management administered 
lands. 
Interagency Agreement for the administrative use of the 
Escalante River Canyon Area. 
Memorandum of Understanding to provide for the coordination, 
at the field level, of management of National Park Service 
areas and associated Bureau of Land Management public land 
areas in Utah. 
Memorandum of Understanding relating to grazing within Glen 
Canyon National Recreation Area in the State of Utah, 
Memorandum of Agreement for repeater sharing and operation 
of two Bureau of Land Management resource radios in the 
Paria Canyon and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in 
Arizona and Utah. 
Cooperative Agreement for bighorn sheep transplant within 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area between the National 
Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources. 
Letter of Understanding for a cooperative plan for liquid 
waste disposal from the Star Springs campgrounds to be 
disposed of in the sewage disposal system at Bullfrog Basin. 
Memorandum of Understanding pertaining to the use of the 
Bureau of Land Management administrative site located at 
Escalante, Utah. 
Memorandum of Understanding for the administration of river 
use on the San Juan River from Montezuma Creek, Utah, to 
Clay Hills Crossing, Utah, located partly within Glen 
Canyon. 
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Between the Navajo Tribe and glen Canyon Nati^al^^crj?ation 
Area 
MeuioranduDi of Agreement relating to the use and development 
of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and adjacent tribal 
lands. 
Memorandum of Agreement related to repeater sharing with the 
Navajo Mountain Ranger, Navajo Nation, Utah. 
Between the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Agreement for administration of recreation 
facilities, lands, water, and reclamation works on land 
withdrawn and acquired by the Bureau of Reclamation in the 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. 
Memorandum from Chief, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
pertaining to grounds maintenance at the Visitor Center. 
Memorandum from Superintendent, Glen Canyon, to Regional 
Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, relating to the 
Dominguez-Escalante Trail Exhibit. 
Memorandum of Agreement concerning the handling of accidents 
at the visitor center and through the tour route. 
Between the U.S. Geological Survey and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Agreement relating to the use and development 
of certain lands within Glen Canyon at Lees Ferry. 
Cooperative Agreement for stream-gauging operations to be 
conducted in the Lees Ferry area, Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area. 
Between the State of Utah and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Cooperative Agreement between Utah Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, to reintroduce 
desert bighorn sheep into Glen Canyon National Recreation 
Area. 
Memorandum of Agreement between Utah Division of Parks and 
Recreation for boating law administration on the Utah 
portion of Lake Powell within Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area. 
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Memorandum of Agreement between Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources for the use of radio frequencies on the Glen 
Canyon radio system. 
Memorandum of Agreement between Utah Division- of Park., and 
Recreation for the use of radio frequencies on the Glen 
Canyon radio system* 
Cooperative communications agreement between Utah Department 
of Transportation, Utah State Highway Patrol, for Gl^n 
Canyon to utilize radio frequencies of the Utah St. 
Highway Patrol. 
Between the City of Page, Arizona, and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Understanding between Page Police Department 
and Glen Canyon for radio dispatch assistance. 
Letter from the Page Police Chief and Page Fire Chief 
authorizing Glen Canyon to utilize two of the City of Page 
radio frequencies. 
Cooperative Agreement between the City of Page and Glen 
Canyon National Recreation Area for construction of Wahweap 
and Lees Ferry visitor-use facilities. 
Between the United States Coast Guard and Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area 
Cooperative Boating Safety Agreement for a boating safety 
program on all waters within the recreation area provided by 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard will be responsible over matters which are within its 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
Cooperative Navigational Aids Agreement for the 
establishment, operation, and maintenance of a system of 
navigational aids and regulatory markers conforming to 
established standards. 
Letter of concurrence for Glen Canyon National Recreation 
Area to use Channel 22 to communicate with boaters on Lake 
Powell. 
Between Garfield County, Utah, and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Understanding between Garfield County, Ut 
Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National Recreation A: -v 
detailing investigative roles of the National Park Service 
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Commissioned Officers in relationship to the State and local 
agencies. 
Memorandum of Agreement for deputation of park rangers by 
the Sheriff of Garfield County, Utah. 
Between Kane County, Utah, and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Understanding between Kane County, Utah, 
Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area 
detailing investigative roles of the National Park Service 
Commissioned Officers in relationship to State and local 
agencies. 
Between Coconino County, Arizona, and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Letter of Authorization for the use of Coconino County 
Sherifffs Office radio frequency for emergency law 
enforcement activities by Glen Canyon National Recreation 
Area. 
Cooperative Agreement for the construction of Wahweap 
visitor use facilities under State Lake Improvement Funds 
(SLIF). 
Memorandum of Understanding Detween Coconino County, 
Arizona, Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area detailing investigative roles of National 
Park Service Commissioned Officers in relationship to State 
and local agencies. 
Between the State of Arizona and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Agreement with the Arizona Department of 
Public Safety and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area for 
deputation of Arizona Department of Public Safety personnel 
as National Park Service Special Police Officers within Glen 
Canyon National Recreation Area. 
Memorandum of Understanding with Arizona Department of 
Public Safety for use of telecommunications site on Navajo 
Mountain by the National Park Service and the use of office 
space at the Wahweap Ranger Office by the Arizona Department 
of Public Safety. 
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Between Samaritan Health Services and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Cooperative Agreement for emergency medical services 
training for National Park Service personnel. 
Cooperative Agreement for adequate and suitable space for 
anv radio communications, recording, and biomedical 
t^emetry equipment needed for monitoring and/or supervision 
of recreation area personnel. 
Between Northern Arizona University and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Cooperative Agreement to provide a cooperative effort toward 
a student-intern program to conduct monitoring and research 
programs on the park and to further educational 
opportunities. 
Cooperative Agreement to establish paleoenvironmental 
programs with the recreation area. 
Between the University of Arizona and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Cooperative Agreement to establish paleoenvironmental 
programs with the recreation area. 
Between Wayne County, Utah, and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Understanding between Wayne County, Utah, 
the Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National -Recreation 
Area detailing investigative roles of the National Park 
Service Commissioned Officers in relationship to State and 
local agencies. 
Between Bullfrog Resort and Marina, Inc., and Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area 
Cooperative Agreement to design, construction, installation, 
maintenance, and security of interior exhibits and displays 
to be located in the Anasazi Restaurant, Bullfrog Basin, 
Utah. 
Between Canyonlands National Park and Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area 
Memorandum of Understanding for mutual coordination of 
management activities and information sharing between both 
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parks in the Orange Cliffs-Hans Flat area and the lower 
Cataract Canyon-upper Lake Powell area. 
Between Navajo Nation and Glen Canyon National Recreation 
Area 
Interagency Agreement for the repair and preventive 
maintenance of Navajo radio equipment by Glen Canyon 
personnel. 
82 
